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Abstract In 2009, the UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee
(STC) conducted an ‘evidence check’ on homeopathy to evaluate evidence for its
effectiveness. In common with the wider literature critical of homeopathy, the STC
report seems to endorse many of the strong claims that are made about its
implausibility. In contrast with the critical literature, however, the STC report
explicitly does not place any weight on implausibility in its evaluation. I use the
contrasting positions of the STC and the wider critical literature to examine the
‘implausibility arguments’ against homeopathy and the place of such arguments
within evidence-based medicine (EBM). I argue that the STC report undervalues its
strong claims about the mechanistic plausibility of homeopathy because it relies on
a misunderstanding about the role of mechanistic evidence within EBM. This is not
a conclusion for a revision of the role mechanistic evidence plays within EBM,
however. It is a conclusion about the inconsistency of the STC report’s position
towards implausibility arguments, given the evidential claims they endorse and the
atypical situation that homeopathy presents. It provides a further example of the
general point that mechanistic reasoning should not be seen as providing categor-
ically lower quality evidence.
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Introduction
In the last 10 years, academic and public debate about homeopathy has renewed
interest in whether it ‘really’ works, whether it is ethical to provide, and in the UK,
what its proper place is within the National Health Service (NHS). In 2005, Shang
et al. [1] published a meta-analysis of homeopathic treatments in the Lancet,
concluding that there was no evidence that homeopathic treatments were better than
placebo. This meta-analysis became a focal point for growing criticism of
homeopathy and attracted many responses in the academic literature [2–14]. Since
the publication by Shang et al., there have been popular science books [15–17],
newspaper articles (see especially the Guardian 2007–2010 [18–23]), and public
campaigns [24, 25], all aimed against the continued place of homeopathy in UK
healthcare.
As a culmination of this critical movement against homeopathy, the UK House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee (STC) conducted an ‘evidence
check’ on homeopathy to investigate these questions, and published their findings in
2010 [26]. The STC have a remit to investigate the evidence that is used for
Government policy and decision-making, and their report on homeopathy is an
interesting document to consider for three reasons. First, it was produced at the peak
of criticism of homeopathy in the UK. Although the report does not explain why the
STC chose to examine Government policy around homeopathy in 2009–2010, the
profile of wider criticism at the time is the likely reason. Second, the report provides
an excellent synthesis of the wider criticism. In fact, the STC considered evidence
submitted to them in writing and through two oral panel sessions that included some
of the most prominent contributors to the public debate [26]. Third, the report does
not simply repeat the wider criticism. In the STC report, as elsewhere, the counter-
intuitive mechanism by which homeopathic treatment is supposed to work is
criticised. However, the STC report draws a quite different conclusion from the
apparent implausibility of homeopathy.
This difference in the way that the STC treats implausibility and the way the
wider literature treats it is the focus of this article. Moreover, the focus is on the
argument that the STC report contains rather than the circumstances that shaped the
STC’s position. The question here is normative: how should the STC report treat
implausibility?
First, I describe the difference between the way that implausibility arguments are
used by the STC in their report and how they are used in the criticisms of
homeopathy that are found in the wider literature. Second, I argue that the STC
report endorses a puzzling position on the implausibility of homeopathy because it
unfairly dismisses plausibility considerations in its evaluation, and because it relies
on a misinterpretation of the role of mechanistic reasoning within evidence-based
medicine (EBM). I argue that on the basis of its own assumptions (which may or
may not be true), the STC report undervalues mechanistic evidence against the
efficacy of the putatively pharmacological component of homeopathic treatment.
Whereas the wider critical literature contains a relatively stable and coherent set
of statements about the mechanistic implausibility of homeopathic treatment that is
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largely carried over into the STC’s report, the STC report is far more cautious about
the conclusions that can be derived from mechanistic reasoning. My argument is
about the consistency of the position adopted in the STC report. It is independent of
the actual state of the mechanistic evidence for or against the efficacy of
homeopathic treatment. My conclusion is that the claims in the STC report are
inconsistent because they are based on a misinterpretation of EBM: the misinter-
pretation is due to the assumption that mechanistic reasoning categorically provides
low quality evidence. In fact, a better interpretation of the EBM view of mechanistic
reasoning would actually allow the STC report to make their argument stronger. If
the report’s claims about implausibility are true, then the report has undervalued the
mechanistic evidence against homeopathy.
Arguments about implausibility in the STC report and the wider critical
literature
What is implausible about homeopathy?
The STC report contains a series of arguments that are all negative towards
homeopathy. The report presents arguments for the conclusion that homeopathic
treatments do not work, as well as for the conclusion that homeopathic treatments
should not be available. I focus only on one argument from the STC report. I am
concerned with what I interpret as the claim that it is implausible that the ‘quasi-
pharmacological component’ of homeopathic treatment could be effective. I use the
term quasi-pharmacological component to highlight two important points (it is not
the STC’s term).
First, the term highlights the counter-intuitive therapeutic theory behind the
preparation of homeopathic medicines. Homeopathic medicines purport to contain
an active component, albeit in an unconventional sense. This is because
homeopathic medicines (that is, the pills themselves) have been exposed to a
‘potentised’ liquid produced through a process of progressive dilution and shaking
(‘succusion’), which began with a substance that, at less dilute doses in healthy
individuals, would cause the patient’s symptoms (this is the ‘like-cures-like’ or
‘similarity’ principle behind homeopathy). Homeopathic medicines are claimed to
be more potent if they have been exposed to a potentised liquid that has gone
through more of these dilution-shaking cycles (this is the ‘high-dilutions’ principle)
[27–33]. Clearly, this contrasts with the more familiar way in which treatments are
said to have active components, such as when they contain a substance in the way
that a painkiller contains paracetamol. Conventionally, a drug treatment becomes
more potent when there is more of the pharmacological component. Consequently, I
refer to the active component of homeopathic treatment as its quasi-pharmacolog-
ical component: homeopathic medicines have a sort-of pharmacological component,
but one that is unusual because of the therapeutic theory behind it. Although the
therapeutic theory behind homeopathy motivates critical arguments about the
implausibility of its effectiveness, the use of the term ‘quasi-pharmacological’ is not
intended to prejudice the discussion. I suggest that homeopathic medicines can be
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said to have a quasi-pharmacological component simply on account of the fact that
the theory is unusual or unconventional, without saying anything further about
plausibility.
Second, referring to the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic
treatment highlights the fact that it is only one of many other components.
Treatments are rightly viewed as a package of components made up of, for example,
bulking agents, pill casings, drug contents, delivery mechanisms, etc., each of which
may or may not be individually effective for the target condition [34–36] (and
which may also interact with each other). Even if the quasi-pharmacological
component of homeopathic treatment is not effective, this does not necessarily mean
that the treatment as a whole is ineffective. In fact, the STC report acknowledges
that idea by claiming that homeopathic treatments are effective through placebo
effects [26]. That is one way to express the idea that some components of a
treatment may be efficacious (the components that give rise to placebo effects),
while others are not.
In these terms, then, this article is concerned with the argument found in both the
wider critical literature and in the STC report, namely, that the purported
effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic treatment is
implausible. In general, the implausibility argument against homeopathy denies that
there is a mechanism by which the quasi-pharmacological component of homeo-
pathic treatments could possibly work, though this is deployed differently in the
STC report and the wider literature.
In the next section, I describe the arguments about implausibility as they are
found in the wider literature that criticises homeopathy, noting the strength of the
conclusion that it most often puts forward. The argument might be better called an
‘impossibility’ argument, which is an important indicator of the rhetorical role that
the strong conclusion in the literature also plays. I then describe the discussion of
implausibility as it appears in the STC report. The key point is that, despite
agreement between the STC and the wider critical literature on the evidence for
implausibility, the STC take a substantially weaker position on the relevance of this
evidence.
Implausibility in the critical literature about homeopathy
Although many of the criticisms of homeopathy received their fullest expression in
the STC report, they have been in circulation and developed in the academic
literature and public media prior to it. Indeed, many have been present throughout
the 200 years of criticism that homeopathy has received since it was first conceived.
In fact, the implausibility of the effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological
component of homeopathic treatment was noted in the 19th century. For example,
John Forbes (who is more charitable about assessing the claims of homeopaths on
their own terms than many others) describes the problems with the idea that
homeopathic treatments could be effective as follows:
to admit the potency of homeopathic medicaments is not so easy. Indeed, it is
so difficult, that all the arguments that have hitherto been adduced in support
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of the affirmative of the proposition [that homeopathy works], are incapable of
making any impression on ordinary minds, while the glaring improbability of
the fact lies open before them.… [T]he reasons against the doctrine are so
manifold and obvious that it is almost unnecessary to state them…. [The
mechanism] seems so gratuitous an outrage to human reason that the mind
instinctively recoils from the proposition. [37, pp. 16–17]
Today, echoing Forbes, similar critical emphasis is placed on the idea that a
substance can get more potent as it is diluted. Timothy Caulfield and Suzanne
Debow conducted a systematic review of how homeopathy was represented in
conventional and alternative medicine journals. They found that within conven-
tional medical journals, nine out of ten review articles ‘begin with a statement that
questions the scientific plausibility of homeopathy’ [38]. Statements of implausi-
bility are common in many other articles about homeopathy, not just systematic
reviews. Consider some of the most prominent examples:
It is in particular the use of highly diluted material that overtly flies in the face
of science. [39]
There is no notion in chemistry or biology that would explain such an
effect…. So, clearly, that is not how homeopathic remedies could work. They
do not work by retaining any active ingredient. [40]
[Homeopathy is] not only out of line with scientific facts but also directly
opposed to them. If homeopathy is correct, much of physics, chemistry, and
pharmacology must be incorrect.… We think that a belief in homeopathy
exceeds the tolerance of an open mind. We should start from the premise that
homeopathy cannot work. [41]
It is a cure that does not make sense in the light of science.… [H]omeopathy
cannot possibly work because it has no scientifically plausible grounds. [42]
Those who claim that homeopathy is effective have enormous unexplained
mysteries, and answering those mysteries would appear to require massive
revision of standard chemistry and physiology…. [T]he balance is heavily
against homeopathy. [43]
We understand that it cannot work through any mechanism that is in
accordance with the known laws of nature. [44]
These are strong claims. The strongest suggest that homeopathy ‘cannot’ work.
Other statements make a slightly weaker claim by allowing the possibility that the
quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy is effective, but balance this
concession against the substantial revisions in our understanding of the sciences that
they claim would be necessary as a result.
The crucial move in this contemporary critical literature is to take the
implausibility of a mechanism by which the quasi-pharmacological component of
homeopathic treatments could be effective as evidence that it is not effective. This
idea is at the heart of what I call an ‘implausibility argument against homeopathy’,
which goes as follows:
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(1) It is very implausible that there could be a mechanism by which the quasi-
pharmacological component of homeopathic treatment is effective.
(2) If it is very implausible that there could be a mechanism for how some
component of a treatment is effective, then it is very unlikely that component
is effective.
Therefore,
(3) It is very unlikely that the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic
treatments is effective.
The critical literature contains many statements like those quoted above that
demonstrate a commitment to the claims made in premise (1) and the conclusion. It
is harder to find a clear statement of premise (2). The move from (1) to (3) is not
spelt out in the literature.
There is some ambiguity in the statements quoted above around whether they are
statements of implausibility or would be better characterised as statements of
impossibility. Those claiming that homeopathy ‘cannot’ work are easily read as
statements of impossibility. If ‘very implausible’ is changed to ‘impossible’ in the
argument above, then it remains valid. However, that also significantly raises the
evidential burden. The argument becomes invalid if one tries to use (1) and (2) as
they stand to draw the conclusion that it is impossible that the quasi-pharmaco-
logical component of homeopathic treatment is effective. Equally, premise (2)
becomes false if it is modified to allow one to move from a very implausible
mechanism to actual ineffectiveness, rather than to very implausible effectiveness.
Reconstructing the argument also requires some sensitivity to the status of the
texts these quotes come from. The strong statements of impossibility are typically
found in editorials and commentary articles, so it is important to acknowledge the
rhetorical force that a claim of this strength possesses, and therefore, to recognise
the role that this kind of discourse plays in attempts to close the debate by
exaggerating the evidence. I suggest that the most charitable construction of the
argument is to put it in terms of implausibility rather than impossibility. Whether the
argument is spelt out in terms of impossibility or implausibility, it is important that
we should not be able to infer that the quasi-pharmacological component of
homeopathy cannot be effective simply because we believe that it should not be
effective. We are not infallible and the implausibility argument does not claim that
we are.
There are two further points to note about this implausibility argument. First, the
argument is based on inferences from theory rather than from comparisons between
groups of individuals; hence, the suggestions that homeopathy is in conflict with
‘known laws of nature’, ‘standard chemistry and physiology’, or ‘much of physics,
chemistry and pharmacology’ (indeed all the basic sciences—physics, chemistry,
biology—are referenced in one or more of the quotes above). The inference is from
basic theoretical knowledge that it is implausible that there could be a mechanism
by which the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy works to the
conclusion that it likely does not work.
Second, it is easy to misunderstand the inference. The arguments made in the
wider critical literature about homeopathy do not conclude that the quasi-
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pharmacological component may be effective because one is in a position of
mechanistic ignorance. That is to say, the conclusion is not that one does not know
or cannot be sure that the quasi-pharmacological component is effective because we
lack a full mechanistic understanding of it. It is an argument for the stronger
conclusion that mechanistic implausibility provides good evidence that the quasi-
pharmacological component of the treatment is very unlikely to be effective. The
claim is that mechanistic implausibility constitutes evidence for the likely absence
of effectiveness.
Implausibility in the STC report
The STC endorse premise (1). In common with the wider critical literature, the STC
report endorses similarly strong claims about the implausibility of a mechanism by
which the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic treatment could be
effective. The key statements in the report occur in paragraphs 48–62, in a
substantial section titled ‘Scientific Plausibility for a Mode of Action’. In this
section of the report, two of the theoretical principles behind homeopathic treatment
that inform the production of homeopathic medicine are scrutinised. The first of
these is the similarity principle, which is the idea that ‘like-cures-like’, noted above.
The second is the notion of potentisation, also noted above, and in particular, the
high level of dilution of the potentised liquids that are used to produce homeopathic
medicines.
The similarity principle and the use of high dilutions are both regarded as
scientifically implausible. For example, the similarity principle is claimed to be
‘theoretically weak’: ‘It fails to provide a credible physiological mode of action for
homeopathic products’ [26, para. 54]. Similarly, the notion of high dilutions is
claimed to give rise to ‘enormous difficulties’: ‘Even if water could retain a memory
of previously dissolved substances, we know of no explanation for why the sugar-
based homeopathic pills routinely dispensed would retain such a memory…. We
consider the notion that ultra-dilutions can maintain an imprint of substances
previously dissolved in them to be scientifically implausible’ [26, paras. 60–61].
To support these claims, the report cites evidence submitted to the STC (either in
writing or during their panel sessions). For example, they quote favourably the view
of David Colqhoun, a professor of pharmacology and prominent critic of
homeopathy: ‘If homeopathy worked, the whole of chemistry and physics would
have to be overturned’ [26]. The report also quotes the view of Jayne Lawrence,
Chief Scientific Advisor to what was at the time the Royal Pharmaceutical Society
of Great Britain: ‘I think it probably would be revolutionary if homeopathy was
proved to be right, because it does go against a lot of fundamental understanding of
science as it stands at the moment’ [26, para. 59]. Again, in common with the wider
critical literature, these claims about the implausibility of the mechanism by which
the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic medicines could be effective
rely on the idea that such a mechanism would be ‘far removed from current
scientific understanding’ [26, para. 59].
As noted above, strong statements of implausibility play an important rhetorical
role by allowing critics of homeopathy to close down the debate about its
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effectiveness as settled. This strategy is also apparent in the STC report when it
questions whether it is appropriate to invest in further research ‘exploring theories
that are not scientifically plausible’. Moreover the STC heard evidence from the
Government Chief Scientific Adviser, who claimed that there is no evidence base
for homeopathy. This led to the STC further recommending that the UK
Government and Department of Health jointly discuss whether there is ‘any merit
in research funding being directed towards the claimed modes of action of
homeopathy’ [26, para. 64]. By questioning the value of funding further research
into homeopathy, the STC report, like the wider critical literature, uses evidence of
implausibility to suggest that the question of whether there is a plausible mechanism
is closed.
I claim, therefore, that the STC report holds the same position as the wider
critical literature in relation to the key evidential premise (1) in the implausibility
argument above. The report endorses the view that it is very implausible that there
could be a mechanism by which the quasi-pharmacological component is effective.
Unlike the wider critical literature, however, the STC reject the use of premise
(1) to make an argument against the effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological
component of homeopathy. The STC report does not appear to endorse the
conclusion of the implausibility argument. Instead, they hold the view that the
implausibility of a mechanism by which the quasi-pharmacological component
could be effective counts for very little in the assessment of whether it is effective.
To illustrate, the STC goes on to de-emphasise the role that plausibility
considerations play in their assessment of the evidence for the effectiveness of
homeopathy: ‘While we comment on explanations for how homeopathy works, it is
not a key part of our Evidence Check’ [26, para. 18]. The STC defend this position
by stating that ‘historically, some medical interventions were demonstrably
effective before anyone understood their modes of action’ [26, para. 18], and that
the ‘lack of scientific plausibility is disappointing, but does not necessarily mean
that a treatment does not work’ [26, para. 65]. Here, the STC report’s reason for not
making plausibility a key part of its evidence check is that one does not need to
understand how a treatment works in order to know that it is effective, and the two
quotes above express this as a historical and conceptual truth. Since such evidence is
unnecessary, it is not considered by the STC.
In sum, the STC agree with the wider critical literature that the effectiveness of
the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy is very implausible. The key
difference between the STC report and wider critical literature is that the STC report
does not value and subsequently use this evidence in their assessment of the
effectiveness of homeopathy. Given the rhetorical force of the implausibility
argument to close down the debate, this deliberate discounting of such evidence is
particularly noteworthy. The STC defend their rejection of plausibility consider-
ations in their evaluation on the basis that evidence of plausibility is not necessary




Evaluating the STC position on implausibility
Absence of evidence and evidence of absence
The STC report is correct that lack of evidence of plausibility should not be taken to
rule out the effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological component. However,
stating that fact, as they do in the quotations above, is not a denial of premise (2);
moreover, it does not engage with the kind of claim being made in premise (1).
Although true, it does not provide a good reason to reject the implausibility
argument. The difference between the implausibility argument and the STC’s
rejection of plausibility considerations is similar to the difference between ‘evidence
of absence’ and ‘absence of evidence’.
To reiterate the premises of the implausibility argument, premise (1) is that it is
very implausible that there could be a mechanism by which the quasi-pharmaco-
logical component of homeopathic treatment is effective. Premise (2) makes a link
between the very implausible possibility of a mechanism and the likely ineffec-
tiveness of that component of a treatment. The implausibility of there being any
mechanism by which the quasi-pharmacological component could be effective is
taken to provide good evidence that the component likely is not effective. The
implausibility argument therefore aims to establish evidence of absence.
This is a separate issue from whether there might be a mechanism that we do not
know or understand, and it is unrelated to the fact that one does not need a treatment
to seem plausible in order to know that it works. The STC report is right to state that
absence of evidence of plausibility is poor grounds to deny the effectiveness of the
quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy. The STC are wrong, however, to
say that this therefore provides a good reason to dismiss the implausibility
argument. The implausibility argument is a much stronger argument based on the
notion that there is unlikely to be any possible mechanism by which the quasi-
pharmacological component could be effective.
The first problem facing the STC’s position, therefore, is that the reasons they
provide for rejecting the relevance of plausibility considerations in general are not
good reasons for rejecting the implausibility argument. Additionally, there is also a
second, more interesting, problem for the STC position. Not only has the STC report
misunderstood the implausibility argument, but it has also undervalued the role of
mechanistic reasoning in the assessment of homeopathy. I argue that the STC have
missed the opportunity to make the argument in their report stronger.
The role of mechanistic reasoning
The STC do not value implausibility as evidence. This can be further seen in the
way the report deploys a distinction between whether and how a treatment works.
The report states: ‘It is more important to know whether a treatment works—its
efficacy—than how it works’ [26, para. 18]. Here, a distinction is made between the
mechanistic question of ‘how’ a treatment works, and the clinical question of
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‘whether’ a treatment works. By making such a distinction, the STC report
establishes the lower importance of mechanistic reasoning.
Furthermore, elsewhere in the STC report, there are clear expectations for what
kind of evidence is most important and should count in the assessment of the
effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy. Namely, the
best evidence comes from the pooled results of randomised trials using a placebo
control. As the report states, ‘In clinical research, it is widely accepted that RCTs
are the best way to evaluate the efficacy of different treatments and distinguish them
from placebos…. We consider that conclusions about the evidence on the efficacy
of homeopathy should be derived from well designed and rigorous randomised
controlled trials (RCTs)’ [26, para. 20]. The report elsewhere states: ‘What is
important is how a treatment performs when tested fairly against a placebo
treatment or other treatments. We consider that the best evidence is provided by
randomised controlled trials, meta-analyses and systematic reviews of RCTs [26,
para. 65].
This position is, of course, exactly what one would expect from a commitment to
EBM. EBM provides the framework for the report’s statements about the ‘wide
acceptance’ of randomised trials as providing good evidence of treatment effects.
Indeed, a placebo-controlled randomised trial is perfectly equipped to assess the
effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic treatment.
Although the STC report does not cite EBM textbooks or any of the current
evidence rating systems (for example, the OCEBM levels [45] or GRADE [46]), the
emphasis on results from single or pooled randomised trials and explicit rejection of
mechanistic questions in favour of clinical questions is clearly very close to typical
EBM accounts about what counts as good evidence for treatment benefit.
Given that the STC report rejects plausibility considerations, and given that I
have claimed that the reasons the STC provide do not warrant this rejection, the
question is whether there are further resources within the EBM paradigm that permit
the STC to dismiss the implausibility argument. I argue no; in fact, I argue that
homeopathy is an unusual case because it is an example of a case in which the EBM
view should be to embrace the implausibility argument.
Mechanistic reasoning and the implausibility argument
The medical literature on EBM has tended to give only a minor role to mechanistic
reasoning about treatment effects, but it has allowed that such reasoning may be
useful in other ways. For example, mechanistic reasoning is operative when
generalising results from study populations to some target population [47].
However, the concession that mechanistic reasoning may be useful for generalising
results has recently been challenged [48]. Jeremy Howick provides a refinement of
the EBM account of mechanistic reasoning and argues that ‘the EBM position
[where relatively little weight is given to mechanistic reasoning] is acceptable on
the whole, [but] mechanistic reasoning can provide strong evidence in certain well-
defined cases’ [49, p. 120]. Contrary to this, other philosophers considering
mechanisms have argued that mechanistic reasoning should be given a more
substantial evidential role within EBM. Perhaps the most discussed claim is one
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made by Federica Russo and Jon Williamson: ‘To establish causal claims, scientists
need the mutual support of mechanisms and dependencies’ [50].
How do these debates bear on the implausibility argument and my interpretation
of the STC position? Giving a greater role to mechanistic reasoning could support
the kinds of claim made in the critical literature about homeopathy. If mechanistic
reasoning is given a greater role, then that provides grounds to consider
implausibility in an evaluation of the effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological
component of homeopathy. Furthermore, if the traditionally dominant view in EBM
is that mechanistic reasoning counts very little, this would seem to explain the
position taken in the STC report, because by sticking to this interpretation, they are
not able to utilise that evidence.
Contrary to this approach, I focus in what follows on Howick’s view, which is
more cautious about the role given to mechanistic reasoning. The reason for
focusing on Howick’s view is to examine the implausibility argument and the STC
report’s position without requiring substantive revisions to the EBM position on
mechanistic reasoning. While giving mechanistic reasoning a much greater
evidential role in EBM is, of course, one position from which to examine the
debate about homeopathy, I suggest that it is fairer to consider a less radical account
of what the proper role of mechanisms are in EBM. Howick’s view is particularly
helpful in this regard because he provides criteria for when mechanistic reasoning
should be considered good evidence.
First then, consider Howick’s definition of ‘mechanistic reasoning’: ‘[mechanis-
tic reasoning] involves an inference from mechanisms to claims that an intervention
produces a patient-relevant outcome. Such reasoning will involve an inferential
claim linking the intervention (such as antiarrhythmic drugs) with a clinical
outcome (such as mortality)’ [49]. This account of mechanistic reasoning is quite
different from the implausibility argument. The way that mechanisms and
mechanistic reasoning are discussed in the philosophy literature focuses on the
presence of a mechanism underwriting some purported effect. For example, the
quote above is illustrated with an example of an inference from knowledge of a drug
treatment’s mechanisms to an effect on mortality. Similarly, in other works on
mechanisms, the focus has been on the presence of mechanisms and establishing
causal claims.
The implausibility argument has a different form, however. Reasoning about
implausibility involves an inference from the absence of a mechanism to the
absence of an effect. The inference is not from the existence of a known mechanism
but from the implausibility that there could be a mechanism, and not to some effect
but to the implausibility of there being any effect. The implausibility argument is
also more specific, in the sense that it is not the effect of a treatment that is in
question but the effect due to one particular feature of the treatment: the quasi-
pharmacological component. The implausibility argument leaves open the possi-
bility that there are other mechanisms by which homeopathic treatment is effective
(one obvious example being expectation effects).
This account also helps clarify a crucial point made above, namely, that the
implausibility argument is not an argument from ignorance: the inference is based
on the claimed absence, not our ignorance, of a mechanism. Indeed, as shown
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above, the STC report and other critics of homeopathy claim that there is a
significant level of empirical support for the implausibility of there being a
mechanism by which the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic
treatment could be effective.
The implausibility argument fits the broad pattern of mechanistic reasoning in so
far as it is an inference from a claim about mechanisms to a claim about effects. But
it is also clearly different from other examples because it is about the lack of any
mechanism and the lack of an effect. Howick suggests that his criteria for judging
the quality of mechanistic reasoning should apply to both acceptance and rejection
of an effect [49]. Here though, there is some ambiguity about whether this might
mean that knowledge of the presence of a specific mechanism can be good evidence
that a treatment cannot have a particular effect, or whether it might mean that
knowledge that there cannot be a mechanism for a particular effect is good evidence
that there is no such effect. It is the latter that is closer to what the implausibility
argument claims. Although Howick does not discuss in detail any examples similar
to the implausibility argument, he does offer the brief suggestion that the reasoning
‘used to question Leibovici’s hypothesis was of high quality’ [49]. This hypothesis
is worth considering in more detail, because it has much in common with the
argument made about homeopathy.
Leonard Leibovici reported results from a randomised trial investigating the
effect of remote, retroactive, intercessory prayer on patients who suffered from
bloodstream infections [51]. The article was humorous and published as part of the
British Medical Journal’s Christmas edition. Like the best articles in the Christmas
editions, it makes a serious point with an absurd example. Leibovici examined the
records of 3393 patients who were treated for bloodstream infections between 1990
and 1996 and randomised into two groups in the year 2000, one of which was
chosen to be prayed for. Leibovici found that while intercessory prayer had no
significant effect on mortality, the intervention group showed a small effect on
secondary outcome measures: they had a statistically significant shorter duration of
fever and a shorter stay in hospital (these two outcomes are not entirely
independent).
Putting aside independent methodological reasons to reject the results of this
study [49], an obvious concern is mechanistic implausibility. On the basis of very
general and fundamental background knowledge about the world, we know that one
cannot, in the present, cause events that happened in the past, and therefore, we
know that there is no mechanism by which remote intercessory prayer could cause
therapeutic effects. (Indeed, the fact that the intervention cannot possibly be the
explanation of the result is what makes Leibovici’s article instructive.)
This result has strong parallels with what critics claim about the quasi-
pharmacological component of homeopathy. Analogously to ruling out Leibovici’s
hypothesis on the basis of general knowledge about causality, we also have general
and fundamental background knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology—so the
critics argue—that rules out the possibility of there being a mechanism by which the
quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy could be effective. If we take
remote retroactive prayer as the component of interest, we can run through the
implausibility argument as set out in the above subsection, ‘Implausibility in the
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Critical Literature about Homeopathy’, unchanged. Leibovici’s hypothesis and the
effectiveness of the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy can both be
subjects of an implausibility argument.
Howick suggests that the mechanistic reasoning used to reject Leibovici’s
hypothesis is likely to be high-quality. I claim that the parallels between Leibovici’s
hypothesis and the implausibility of homeopathy warrant considering whether the
implausibility argument against homeopathy might also count as high-quality
reasoning. This is despite the fact, as outlined above, that the mechanistic reasoning
involved does not proceed in the typical way from presence of mechanism to
presence of effect.
Does the implausibility argument against homeopathy constitute high-quality
mechanistic reasoning?
Howick argues that mechanistic reasoning ought to fulfil two criteria if it is to be
counted as good evidence for a treatment effect. (Actually Howick is stricter in
requiring not just any effect but an effect that is patient-relevant.)
(a) The knowledge of mechanisms upon which the mechanistic reasoning is
based is not incomplete, i.e., there are no obvious gaps in our knowledge of
the inferential chain linking the intervention and the patient relevant outcome.
(b) The probabilistic and complex nature of mechanisms are explicitly taken into
account when inferring from mechanisms to any claims that a particular
intervention has a patient-relevant benefit. [49]
Neither of these criteria fit the implausibility argument perfectly. In both cases, it is
assumed that mechanistic reasoning is being used to link an intervention to an
effect. However, these criteria can be adapted for the absence of a mechanism. The
first criterion, ‘not incompleteness’ bears on the implausibility argument, I suggest,
by requiring evidence for premise (1) to be genuine evidence of absence and not
absence of evidence. The claim that it is very implausible that there could be a
mechanism should not rely on lack of knowledge about possible mechanisms, but
rather, should rely on ‘not incomplete’ knowledge of why such a mechanism is very
implausible. Leibovici’s study provides a good example of this: it is very
implausible that remote retroactive prayer could be effective because any
mechanism would have to contradict, or be a special exception to, the general
and fundamental idea that causes precede their effects. That one cannot now cause
events in the past is an example of the kind of ‘not incomplete’ knowledge that is
required by Howick’s criterion.
The second criterion, that complexity should be accounted for, is less
straightforward to adapt. The spirit of this criterion comes from the observation
by Howick that mechanisms are rarely, if ever, simple systems and many difficult-
to-predict factors potentially affect whether a mechanism goes through. Conse-
quently, I suggest that the evidence on which we claim that there cannot be a
mechanism must be sensitive to the complexity that might exist between treatment
and effect. To illustrate how this might affect plausibility arguments, consider that
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one might defend Leibovici’s result against apparent implausibility by noting that
the supernatural properties of prayer exempt it from considerations based on cause
and effect in the natural world. Proponents of homeopathy often make a similar kind
of manoeuvre by invoking the complex physical–chemical properties of water. They
often respond to implausibility claims with counter-arguments based on the macro-
structures, fractals, or quantum properties of water [28, 52, 53].1 The important
question that Howick’s second criterion prompts in the case of the implausibility
argument is whether there is reason to think that homeopathy provides a special
exception to general knowledge about dilutions and potency and so on. Is there
some degree of complexity in the link between the treatment and purported effect
that could undermine the idea that the possibility of a mechanism really is very
implausible?
Given what both the STC report and the wider critical literature state about the
implausibility of a mechanism by which the quasi-pharmacological component of
homeopathy could be effective, does this qualify as high-quality evidence? I claim it
does. To repeat, the STC claim that a mechanism would be ‘far removed from
current scientific understanding’, and that homeopathic principles are ‘theoretically
weak’ and present ‘enormous difficulties’. The claim in both the wider literature and
the STC report is that there is good evidence that there cannot be a mechanism, not
that there is no evidence for what the mechanism could be. If those claims are true
(as the STC claim they are), then this must count as high-quality mechanistic
reasoning. The claims that a mechanism for the effectiveness of the quasi-
pharmacological component would contradict fundamental principles of physics,
chemistry, and biology constitutes the kind of ‘not incomplete’ knowledge that
fulfils Howick’s first criterion. The knowledge we have that (critics claim) allows
one to rule out a mechanism for homeopathy is among our most fundamental
background knowledge.
Furthermore, fulfilling Howick’s second criterion, this knowledge is sufficiently
general, so critics claim, that we can confidently assert that it is very implausible
that there could be a mechanism without worrying that there may be some
unconsidered or unknown mechanisms by which the quasi-pharmacological
component could, in fact, be effective. Critics claim there is nothing complex
about homeopathy that makes it a special exception. This is what motivates those
very strong rhetorical claims that homeopathy ‘cannot’ work: the claim is that our
evidential position is sufficiently strong to make the effectiveness of homeopathy a
closed question.
It is important to note that I am not endorsing this as the correct evidential
position to take. I claim that the implausibility argument constitutes high quality
mechanistic reasoning if one adopts the evidential position towards the implausi-
bility of homeopathy that the STC adopt in their report, and which is also adopted in
the wider critical literature. This is a conditional claim. I am not arguing that
mechanistic reasoning about homeopathy should be taken as strong evidence. I am
1 Of course, this evidence itself is a form of mechanistic reasoning that one could evaluate using
Howick’s criteria. The validity of this to and fro between proponents and opponents of homeopathy is not
the concern here, however.
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instead arguing that if one believes what the STC endorse in their report, then one
should take mechanistic reasoning about homeopathy as strong evidence. Conse-
quently, I claim that the STC have made a mistake by not doing this.
Conclusion
The STC endorse the same evidential position as the wider critical literature about
homeopathy. Both claim that it is very implausible that there could be a mechanism
by which the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathic treatment is
effective. Unlike the wider critical literature, the STC do not build this into an
‘implausibility argument’ against homeopathy. They reject using plausibility
considerations. I have argued that they do not give good reasons for their rejection
of plausibility considerations.
Furthermore, I have argued that the rejection of plausibility considerations does
not follow from Howick’s refinement of the role that mechanisms should play in
EBM. The STC report adopts the typical EBM view that mechanistic reasoning
counts for very little. If homeopathic treatments were like other conventional drug
treatments, then this would be the acceptable position to hold. The case of
homeopathy is different however because of what the STC report claims about its
implausibility. I have argued that the report’s statements about implausibility fulfil
Howick’s criteria for being high-quality mechanistic reasoning (assuming that what
the STC claim is true). As a result, evidence of implausibility should count in
evaluations of whether the quasi-pharmacological component is effective, contrary
to the approach taken in the STC report. On the basis of their own assessment of the
evidence, the STC should have been able to make the implausibility argument. In
doing so, they could have strengthened their case against homeopathy.
There are two important points to note about this conclusion. Firstly, as I have
emphasised, this conclusion is conditional. The STC can make a stronger argument
only if their evidential claims are warranted. In fact, proponents of homeopathy may
be in the better epistemic position here, since they only need to prevent the efficacy
of the quasi-pharmacological component of homeopathy being ruled out to put the
mechanistic debate ‘on the table’. That is to say, unless the strong evidential
premise in the implausibility argument can be justified, it is not a sound argument. I
have not discussed the to and fro between opponents and proponents of
homeopathy, however, a key aspect of the controversy is the use of statements
about plausibility to frame certain questions as open or closed, and to shift the
burden of evidence in precisely this way. Again, coming back to the interaction
between philosophical and sociological issues, an interesting epistemological
question is whether a dialectical standard of evidence is appropriate in the debate
over the assessment of homeopathy [54].
Secondly, this conclusion is fundamentally about the consistency of the position
adopted in the STC report. By adhering to a dismissive view of mechanistic
reasoning (which is typically the correct view), the STC report has failed to make
the most of its own strong evidential claims. Consequently, the STC report’s
position on the implausible effectiveness of homeopathic treatments provides a
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further example of the more general point that mechanistic reasoning should not be
seen as providing categorically lower quality evidence. The implication of this is
that any evaluation of the evidence for the efficacy of the quasi-pharmacological
component of homeopathic treatment ought to take into account the mechanistic
evidence for and against its purported efficacy. For homeopathy, and unlike most
conventional treatments, the purported mechanisms and principles behind the
treatment are directly relevant to the debate, if, as critics claim, they can be ruled out
as highly implausible.
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